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An important way to resolve games of conflict (snowdrift, hawk-dove, chicken)
involves adopting a convention: a correlated equilibrium that avoids any con-
flict between aggressive strategies. Dynamic networks allow individuals to re-
solve conflict via their network connections rather than changing their strat-
egy. Exploring how behavioral strategies coevolve with social networks reveals
new dynamics that can help explain the origins and robustness of conven-
tions. Here we model the emergence of conventions as correlated equilibria
in dynamic networks. Our results show that networks have the tendency to
break the symmetry between the two conventional solutions in a strongly bi-
ased way. Rather than the correlated equilibrium associated with ownership
norms (play aggressive at home, not away), we usually see the opposite host-
guest norm (play aggressive away, not at home) evolve on dynamic networks,
a phenomenon common to human interaction. We also show that learning to
avoid conflict can produce realistic network structures in a way different than
preferential attachment models.
1 Introduction
An essential feature of cooperation involves resolving conflicts, and an effective way to resolve
conflicts is to adopt a convention that avoids them altogether. Evolutionary game theory pro-
vides a way to represent the conflicts associated with the problem of cooperation (16, 34, 53),
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and reinforcement learning can produce adaptive solutions to broad classes of strategic inter-
actions (7, 11, 15, 23, 24, 30, 43). In games of conflict (snowdrift, hawk-dove, chicken) (53)
individuals can learn to a play a correlated equilibrium, similar to turn-taking, that does better
than the mixed Nash equilibrium (4,26,31,47). These solutions, often understood as an impor-
tant aspect of conventions, play a central role in evolutionary accounts of coordinated action,
territoriality, and ownership (1, 20, 27, 31–33, 47, 51, 57). However, most studies of convention
examine learning or evolution with random interactions or static network structures. In reality,
learning affects social networks as well as behavior. Individuals may seek out or avoid others
based on past interactions and this can have profound effects on strategy choices, as work on
dynamic networks has shown (2, 17, 19, 25, 35, 36, 38–41, 46, 50, 54, 55), an effect also seen
in empirical work on human behavior (12). For games of conflict, dynamic networks allow
individuals to avoid aggressive neighbors by choosing their interaction partners which tends
to promote cooperation (14), although some static network structures work against coopera-
tion (22).
Here we present novel results regarding the emergence of conventions as correlated equi-
librium solutions for games of conflict. We use a coevolutionary model where both network
ties and behavioral strategies evolve by reinforcement learning. Few previous studies model
co-evolution of network and strategy evolving with reinforcement learning (1, 37, 48) and none
have explored how dynamic networks influence the evolution of correlated equilibria. We em-
ploy computer simulations to search the entire payoff space for games of conflict and to explore
dynamic behavior over a wide range of additional model parameters, including population size.
We find that correlated equilibria often emerge spontaneously as a natural result of reinforce-
ment learning on networks, and that dynamic networks strongly favor the so-called paradoxical
solution where individuals act aggressively away but not at home. This result suggests that
the prevalence of territoriality and ownership behaviors is not primarily a matter of conven-
tion. Our results also have relevance to general mechanisms of network formation. Learning to
avoid conflict by evolving network ties can produce realistic network structures and thus pro-
vides another potential mechanism for social network formation that differs from preferential
attachment (5,14, 36).
In games of conflict each agent can play one of two strategies: an aggressive, competitive
strategy (hawk) or a more passive, cooperative strategy (dove). For economy of presentation
we will use the hawk-dove terminology but the results apply equally to any game of conflict
meeting the payoffs defined in Fig. 1a (53). The highest payoff results from playing hawk
against dove, the lowest from playing hawk against hawk and all players would prefer their
opponent to play dove. Agents playing these games either coordinate on who gets the large
payoff, compete for a resource, or engage in a standoff. In an unstructured population common
evolutionary dynamics (e.g., replicator dynamics) converge on the mixed Nash equilibrium of
the game: host plays dove with probability x1/(1 − y1 + x1) and the visitor plays dove with
probability x2/(1− y2 + x2).
Introducing a dynamic network permits individuals to find solutions different than the mixed
Nash (summarized in Fig. 1c). If network ties are updated symmetrically using reinforcement
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learning (i.e., both players update their network ties based on their interaction payoffs as in (37,
48)), there is a new potential solution to games of conflict: agents can learn pure strategies while
learning to interact with suitable partners. In these cases a hub-and-spoke network structure
tends to emerge. One agent becomes a hub and learns to play a pure dove strategy whereas
other agents in the population learn to play pure hawk and only visit the dove hub. In effect,
agents structure their interaction network to avoid conflict, allowing for a kind of cooperation
in games of conflict, as previous work has shown (14).
Another potential new solution, in the form of efficient correlated equilibria, can emerge
when individuals are able to coordinate their strategies on an external cue or signal. Correlating
behavior on some external cue (say a coin toss) can produce a convention, such as taking turns
playing aggressively (e.g., player one plays hawk when heads, dove otherwise; and player two
plays hawk when tails, dove otherwise) (4, 47). Indeed, correlated equilibria can be learned by
relatively simple learning rules (3, 13, 21), and are also readily learned by humans (10). In the
context of networks, correlated equilibria may arise if individuals learn their host and visitor be-
havior independently. This enables them to play one way when hosting and another way when
visiting, using their role as host versus visitor as the public cue (Fig. 1b). At one such correlated
equilibrium individuals play what is called the bourgeois strategy, where they play hawk when
hosting and dove when visiting. This strategy has been invoked as an explanation for norms of
ownership or territoriality (31, 32). That is, norms of ownership may just be a conventional so-
lution to games of conflict, rather than reflecting the intrinsic value of the resource or territory.
However, there is another equally efficient solution that uses the paradoxical strategy, where
one plays dove when hosting and hawk when visiting. This alternative solution complicates
the evolutionary account of ownership and territoriality. In unstructured populations with sym-
metric payoffs both solutions are strongly stable and evolve with equal frequency (47). This
presents a problem of symmetry-breaking: why does it seem that the bourgeois strategy is so
much more prominent in nature (see, e.g., (28)) when there is another equally viable option?
Previous work has argued that individual learners who are sensitive to relatively small inequal-
ities in value of the territory or fighting ability of the current owner may break the symmetry
and strongly favor the bourgeois solution (47). Here we develop a model to investigate the
emergence and stability of these correlated equilibria for games of conflict.
2 Methods
2.1 The Model
In our dynamic network model agents simultaneously learn how to behave and with whom to
interact via Roth-Erev reinforcement. Roth-Erev reinforcement learning provides a simple yet
psychologically realistic learning dynamic in which an individual’s behavior evolves iteratively
in response to the payoffs obtained through interaction (11). This contrasts with other models of
evolutionary game theory, such as the replicator dynamics, where “learning” (evolution) occurs
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globally across the populations as individuals reproduce at rates proportional to the success of
their behavioral strategies. In reinforcement learning, individuals have weights associated with
each possible behavior and these weights are updated based on the payoffs received during their
interactions (Fig. 1a–b). Unlike imitation learning, reinforcement learning does not require
individuals to track the behaviors or payoffs of other players in the population, a common
feature in contagion models (9); an agent only tracks the payoffs associated with their own
behavior and update their learning weights accordingly. Initial weights determine the initial
behavior of the system. For instance, when initial weights are equal and relatively small we
see effectively random behavior on a uniform network at the start. At every time step each
agent visits another agent to play a game, receives a payoff, and updates learning weights. This
update can be symmetric—both host and visitor update their network connection and strategy
weights simultaneously—or asymmetric—the hosts only update their strategy choices when
hosting whereas the visitors update both their network connection and strategy choices when
visiting. The rationale for this particular asymmetry is that while individuals can control their
behavioral strategies when hosting or visiting, and who they visit, they cannot control who
decides to visit them. Specifically, we implement this asymmetry by having separate learning
weights for hosting and visiting roles, allowing individuals the potential to learn different host
and visitor strategies. Also, since hosts have no control over who decides to visit, only visitors
update their network connections based on the interactions payoffs.
The asymmetry in network updating allows for correlated equilibria to emerge and evolve
with respect to player roles and therefore provides a way to investigate the conventional origins
of norms of ownership or territoriality. Also, in contrast to many previous dynamic network
models that allow network ties to form or dissolve discretely (14, 17, 36, 41), our model allows
network connections to strengthen or weaken as a function of interaction payoffs. Since ties are
rarely discrete in social networks (6,18,56), modeling network connections with reinforcement
learning adds an important element of realism. Furthermore, modeling network ties through
reinforcement learning avoids the need to fix the number of network ties which can affect the
results (42). Instead, we allow the number (strength) of ties to evolve endogenously in response
to learning.
More precisely, we model a set of N agents engaged in pairwise games of conflict across
a number rounds. Each round, every agent choses one other agent to visit and engages in
an interaction. During each interaction the host and visitor independently choose a behavior,
receive a payoff, and learn via reinforcement. All players have one interaction as a visitor and
up to N − 1 interactions as a host.
Each agent i has two vectors (wH , wD) and (wh, wd) with i’s reinforcement weights for
each strategy when hosting or visiting respectively. Each agent i also has a vector representing
their reinforcement weights for choice of which player to visit: (wi1, wi2, ..., win) where wij
represents the weight related to player i visiting player j. Self-visits are not allowed (wii =
0). Initial weights for both strategy choices are set to 1, while network partner weights are
uniformly set to L
N−1 . We adopted the convention of L = 19 so network partner weights for the
smallest population size we study (N = 20) would start at 1 (wij = 1 for all i, j with i 6= j as the
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Figure 1 — Coevolution of network ties and strategies. a, Payoff matrix for the hawk-dove
game. b, Reinforcement learning for host and visitor roles. c, Starting from uniform homo-
geneous mixing (fully connected network) and random strategies, populations tend to evolve
into one of four stable outcomes depending on early random events and simulation parameters:
Bourgeois, Paradoxical, Network or Hybrid solutions. Node colors represent strategy weights,
node size is proportional to number of expected visitors and stronger connections are denoted
with darker lines.
baseline). We kept L constant across different population sizes to ensure that the reinforcement
learning has a similar speed relative to total initial weights in larger population sizes. Changing
L effectively varies network learning speed; larger L values slow the responsiveness of an agent
to interaction payoffs. (See Supplemental Information for further details about initial weights
and varying learning speeds.)
The model has two modular dynamical components: discounting (δ) and errors (). Dis-
counting involves reducing past learning weights as more reinforcement occurs, effectively
allowing agents to forget older strategies and network connections (11, 37). Errors represent
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mistakes, mutations, or noise where an agent selects a strategy or node in the network at ran-
dom rather than according to their learning weights. Both of these components are known to
impact the stability and long-run behavior of reinforcement learning (48).
When taking an action, for a given agent in a given context (Host, Visitor, Partner Choice),
the probability of choosing option s is proportional to the current relevant weights:
Pr(s) = (1− ) ws∑
s′ ws′
+ 
1
|S| (1)
where  is the error rate, S is the relevant set of available choices (i.e., visiting strategies, hosting
strategies, or choice of player to visit), s ∈ S and s′ ∈ S.
After each instance of learning, the relevant weights are discounted by a factor δ and in-
creased by the received payoff (pi).
w′s = (1− δ)ws + pis (2)
wherew′s is the weights after updating and pis is the most recent payoff related to choosing action
s. pis = 0 if action swas not chosen. All visits and strategy choices occur simultaneously within
a round. All weights are updated simultaneously after each round at a rate of one update per
related interaction from that round. Payoffs received for strategy choice when visiting do not
alter the weights for strategy choice when hosting and vice versa. Likewise, payoffs received
for hosting do not affect adjacency weights for choosing which other agents to visit.
3 Results
We explore our model through simulations of reinforcement learning on the asymmetric dy-
namic network. To provide some context for interpreting the simulation results, let us first
describe the sort of solutions we see for games of conflict on dynamic networks. First, there
are correlated equilibrium solutions. Note that a population may reach a correlated equilibrium
by coordinating their strategies on whether they are host or visitor in one of two ways. Agents
may learn to play hawk when hosting and dove when visiting. Hosts always receive the max-
imal payoff and visitors always receive x2 (the bourgeois solution). Alternatively, agents may
learn to play dove when hosting and hawk when visiting. This equilibrium grants the visitors
the maximal payoff while the hosts receive x1 (the paradoxical solution). In these cases the
resulting network is a homogeneous, fully connected graph that approximates a randomly mix-
ing population. Once the correlated equilibrium is established, visiting any agent yields the
same payoff as everyone is deploying the same strategies conditional on the same cues. These
correlated equilibrium solutions effectively avoid any conflict between aggressive hawk strate-
gies, and these solutions are commonly found in asymmetric network runs with discounting and
errors.
Distinct from correlated equilibrium solutions, there are network solutions that mitigate
conflict by utilizing network structure alone: if any agent starts to lean towards dove as host then
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agents learn to visit that dove-leaning agent more and also learn to play hawk when they visit.
This produces a hub-spoke network structure with one dove-host attracting many hawk-visitors.
In symmetric dynamic network runs we usually see network solutions emerge. Hybrid solutions
involve a combination of the paradoxical correlated convention with the network solution where
a small number of dove hubs learn the correlated equilibrium and visit each other while hawk
spokes learn a pure (aggressive) strategy and maintain connection to the paradoxical dove-as-
host hubs. Hybrid solutions usually emerge for asymmetric network runs with discounting but
no errors (e.g., Fig. 2).
Hawk
Dove
Mixed
Time: 25 steps Time: 1,000 steps
Time: 10,000 steps Time: 1,000,000 steps
Figure 2 — Illustrative example. A representative result of coevolution of network and strate-
gies in a larger population (N=500, discount δ = .01, no error, payoff x1 = x2 = 0.2,
y1 = y2 = 0.6). Without errors the network approaches a complicated hybrid solution. Node
size is proportional to number of expected visitors.
Across all simulations we find that agents arrive at solutions to the games of conflict that
fall into one of the four families described above: the two potential conventions (bourgeois and
paradoxical), network solutions, or hybrid solutions (as in Fig. 1c). We find no instances of
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Figure 3 — Simulation results. a Heatmaps representing the proportion of outcomes approach-
ing the paradoxical convention for the space of all possible games of conflict with symmetric
payoffs (discount δ = .01, error  = .01, N=20). b Heatmap representing the proportion of
outcomes approaching paradoxical convention for a slice of the asymmetric payoff space where
y2 + x2 = 1, y1 + x1 = 1. The x axis shows the ratio of dove-dove to dove-hawk payoffs
for visitors, while the y axis shows the same ratio for the hosts’ payoffs. This ratio represents
the relative incentive to find a dove parter while playing dove. (δ = .01,  = .01, N=20). c
The proportion of paradoxical behavior produced by simulations runs (1,000 seeds) for random
versus uniform initial learning weights both with and without network learning. Payoffs are as
follows: y1 = 0.5, x1 = 0.4, y2 varies from 0.2 to 0.9 (along the x-axis), and x2 = y2−0.1. The
vertical dashed line represents symmetrical payoffs. When y2 < y1, payoffs are biased towards
the bourgeois strategy, and when y2 > y1, payoffs are biased towards the paradoxical strategy.
d, Convergence to homogeneous network in the Bourgeois and Paradoxical solution across dif-
ferent population sizes. Parameters in this plot are as follows: Payoffs x2 = 0.3, y2 = 0.5,
x1 = 0.6, and y1 = 0.8, δ = 0.01,  = 0.01. e, The degree distribution of networks across simu-
lation results shows heterogeneity of network ties across individuals in the population (δ = .01,
no error, N=1,000, payoff x1 = x2 = 0.2, y1 = y2 = 0.6, average of 10 simulations shown).
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the the mixed Nash equilibrium and simulation runs approach one of the four solution families
by one million time steps with only very rare exceptions. The relative frequency of outcomes
approaching each family varies with the presence of errors, the rate of discounting, and the
specific values of the payoffs. Here we present the results with discounting for both network
connections and strategies, as well as with and without errors. These results are qualitatively
representative for a constellation of other factors, including larger population sizes, different rel-
ative learning speeds for strategy and networks connections, and learning with no discounting.
Additional results are discussed in the Supplemental Information.
We conducted an exhaustive search of the entire payoff space for games of conflict (omitting
near boundary cases where yi or xi approach 0 or 1). As shown in Fig. 3a, the paradoxical
solution is by far the most prevalent outcome of simulation runs for symmetric payoffs. We also
investigated the case where hosts and visitors have different payoff functions, effectively valuing
resources differently when host versus visitor. When payoffs are biased in this way, such that it
may be more valuable to play a particular strategy (hawk or dove) at home rather than away (or
vice versa), the paradoxical solution is still prevalent, though less so when payoffs are strongly
biased towards the bourgeois solution (Fig. 3b; SI). It is important to note that biasing the
payoffs in this way makes the bourgeois solution Pareto optimal and, in many contexts, makes
it the preferred or expected equilibrium of evolutionary processes (45, 49). The prevalence of
the paradoxical solution in cases where the payoffs favor the bourgeois solution reveals the
influence dynamic networks on breaking the symmetry of conventions.
Initializing simulations with random rather than uniform starting learning weights on initial
strategies further increases the prevalence of paradoxical results on dynamic networks (Fig. 3c).
As a control case, we examined the model without network learning where agents simply choose
whom to visit at random every round while still including asymmetric strategy updating. This
is equivalent to a randomly mixing population. As one would expect in this case, we see an
even split between bourgeois and paradoxical solutions when payoffs are symmetrical (Fig. 3c).
When payoffs are biased towards one solution or another we see a proportional increase in that
solution evolving, with random learning weights introducing more noise. Perhaps surprisingly,
the dynamical results are insensitive to population size—we see the same qualitative dynamics
in populations of sizes from 20 to 2,000 (Fig. 3d).
Without errors discounting leads to behavioral trapping; agents may eventually forget strat-
egy choices and network connections, sometimes producing suboptimal results (37). In our
model discounting without errors produces stable complex hybrid solutions with only rare ex-
ceptions. Fig. 2 shows the network evolution and emergence of a hybrid solution for a large
population without errors. These networks have heterogeneous degree distributions that are
different from random (i.e., Erdos-Renyi) networks (Fig. 3e). The difference from random net-
works arises in the tail of the degree distribution, indicating a substantial probability to observe
nodes with far more connections than the typical value. This reflects the formation of hubs
(either pure dove or paradoxical) that attract many visitors, illustrating a phenomenon found in
many real-world networks (5,8,52). Learning to avoid conflict via reinforcement learning with-
out discounting thus produces a result relevant to current network science: we see realistic net-
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work structures produced by an alternative mechanism of social network formation that differs
from the preferential attachment and fitness models. Those models are based on a mechanism
of growing the network by adding nodes that preferentially attach to already highly-connected
nodes in the network. Our social network formation model is a self-organizing mechanism that
is based on a network with a fixed number of nodes in which tie strengths are modified to avoid
conflict.
Errors promote exploration and allow learning to avoid the trapping states. When including
an error rate ( = 0.001 or 0.01) the system becomes ergodic, but simulations in the medium-
run always show populations close to one of the four solution families. Most often the system
is found near one of the conventional solutions with a near homogeneous network. In contrast
to Fig. 2, the inclusion of errors tends to eliminate the dove hubs found in hybrid solutions.
Through exploration allowed by errors, the dove hubs tend to find each other and quickly learn
the paradoxical solution. Once this starts to catch on, the rest of the population follows, which
produces a more homogeneous network playing a correlated equilibrium (see Fig. 4). This
result is observed across population sizes (Fig. 3d).
Of particular interest in reinforcement models is learning speed. Learning speeds can be
varied in the model by varying the rate at which weights are accumulated. We systematically
investigated the relative speeds of learning for updating network ties and strategies. Previous
studies found that varying learning speeds have a noticeable effect on results. Faster network
learning speeds tends to promote cooperation (14,37,48). In our model we found varying learn-
ing speeds had relatively little effect on resulting behavior. Without errors faster network learn-
ing speed tends to produce hybrid or network solutions, closing off the correlated equilibria.
With the addition of errors the network solutions disappear and we see mostly the paradoxical
convention. When strategy learning is faster agents tend to quickly learn one of the conventional
solutions and the network tends to stay more homogenous throughout their evolution (for more
detailed discussion of these results see Supplemental Information).
4 Discussion
The simulation results support a general conclusion: dynamic networks consistently favor the
paradoxical solution over the bourgeois solution across a wide range of parameters. The results
for probing the possible payoff space for games of conflict show how frequently simulations
produce paradoxical outcomes (Fig. 3a). Notice the relative rarity of the bourgeois solution,
even for cases where host and visitor attach different values to playing hawk as host versus
hawk as visitor (Fig. 3b). Only when payoffs are very strongly biased in favor of playing dove
when visiting, or against dove when hosting, do we find the bourgeois solution more often than
the paradoxical solution (Fig. 3c). If there is no bias or any bias in favor of dove when hosting,
or against dove when visiting, the paradoxical solution is far more prominent. A common view
on the origin of territoriality or norms of ownership takes the evolution and stability of the
bourgeois correlated equilibrium to provide a rationale for aggressively defending territories or
10
Transition	to	paradoxical	solution	directly.
(11%	of	simulations)
Transition	via	complete	 hub-spoke	with	a	single	hub.
(8%	of	simulations)
Transition	via	some	network	solution	(two	or	more	
hubs). (81%	of	simulations)
Invention of correlated 
convention.
Figure 4 — Temporal evolution. Analysis of the possible evolutionary trajectories that produce
the paradoxical solution. While some populations find the paradoxical solution right away, most
transition to the paradoxical convention by first developing a hub-spoke structure indicative of
network or hybrid solutions. Plots show mean value across all simulations that fall into a specific
evolutionary path. Node size shown proportional to number of expected visitors.
resolving conflicts over resources in favor of hosts (27, 31, 32, 47). In stark contrast, our results
show that a host-guest norm, where the host concedes resources to a visitor, evolves far more
readily than any norm of territoriality.
The prevalence of the paradoxical solution occurs because the network solution breaks the
symmetry between correlated equilibria. In network solutions hubs are strongly reinforced to
play dove as host. If a hub agent finds another dove host to visit then the hub will visit that host
more. Once the network connection is strengthened, while hub agents are reinforced to play
dove as host by their hawk visitors, they can learn to play hawk as visitor against the other dove
host. When this correlated convention is discovered, the rest of the population quickly learns
it. Fig. 3 shows the possible evolutionary routes to the paradoxical solution. It is only when
the bias of the payoffs toward hawk-when-hosting and dove-when-visiting is strong enough
to overwhelm the influence of the dynamic network that we see the regular evolution of the
bourgeois strategy. This is further illustrated by the fact that slower network learning does
not lead to the paradoxical solution as frequently as fast network learning (see Supplemental
Information).
This result has an important implications for evolutionary accounts of when or where cer-
tain conventions may arise. Note that our model represents scarcity of resources indirectly as
variation in payoff biases (Fig. 2d-e), though we do not consider catastrophic scarcity or inter-
action outcomes. So, for instance, in the case of territories individuals either are not evicted
when conceding to an aggressive opponent, or they can find another territory without severe
cost. Also, the model assumes that losses incurred when playing dove against hawks are not
overwhelming; individuals do not die or lose all mating opportunities if they concede too many
resources. Including scarcity of resources introduces new dynamical elements that may produce
different results. If the number of territories is severely limited and a territory is necessary for
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survival or reproduction, then there is a zero-sum aspect to holding territories that would im-
pact the evolutionary dynamics beyond the game of conflict. The potential significance of these
factors would mean that ownership of a territory or control of the resource would confer some
intrinsic value and norms of ownership would not play a merely conventional role in avoiding
conflict. Our model reveals that in dynamic networks a prevalence territoriality is not due to
relatively small differences in efficiency between the bourgeois and paradoxical conventions.
These results support the view that territoriality is prevalent because holding a territory has sig-
nificant value beyond providing an efficient convention for resolving potential conflicts. If there
is no scarcity of resources, or no competition over territories, a host-guest convention is much
more likely to emerge even when moderately inefficient. Indeed, this may explain why we tend
to see host-guest conventions emerge in many domains of human interaction.
Regarding the evolution of convention more generally, Peyton Young defines a convention
as a “pattern of behavior that is customary, expected and self-enforcing” (57) and other schol-
ars have identified correlated equilibria as central to conventions (51). Our results demonstrate
that correlated equilibria can readily emerge in dynamic networks. In this setting, which agent
initiates the interaction provides a ready cue for reinforcement learning and sets the stage for
correlated equilibria. Although some accounts of convention involve agents’ expectations or
beliefs about the behavior of other agents (29, 51, 57), our model shows that learners with no
such beliefs or expectations can establish convention-like behavior (i.e., strategic behavior uni-
formly adopted from amongst equally viable alternatives that is self-enforcing). Furthermore,
many potential conventions in game-theoretic contexts pose problems of symmetry since many
conventions are equally efficient. The results presented here show that equally efficient conven-
tions will not evolve with equal probabilities in dynamic networks and thus provides a potential
answer to the equilibrium selection problem (44) in these cases.
In conclusion, our results have two important consequences. First, allowing individuals to
avoid aggressive neighbors by choosing their interaction partners through a realistic learning
mechanism (reinforcement learning) reveals a novel way to resolve games of conflict by pro-
moting hub-spoke structures that, in turn, break the symmetry between correlated equilibria in
a strongly biased way. We know that learning in social networks has profound effects on dy-
namics for other classes of games and most often the results show that dynamic networks favor
cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma or stag hunt games (14, 37, 41, 48). Our study of dynamic
networks in games of conflict adds further generality to these results—the network structures
that evolve help resolve conflict—and also reveals a surprising tendency to undermine the usual
narrative about how the bourgeois convention provides a rationale for norms of ownership or
property. Reinforcement learners in dynamic networks have a strong tendency to find the para-
doxical solution. Agents only tend to find the bourgeois solution when there are obvious and
systematic benefits to territorial behavior: the interaction payoffs for games of conflict need to
be biased in such a way that the host values playing hawk much more than a visitor. This entails
that insofar ownership and territoriality are probably widespread due to the intrinsic importance
of holding resources or the value of owning a territory rather than as a convention for avoiding
conflict. Second, simple reinforcement learning in a dynamic network can produce realistic
12
network structures in a way that does not presume a growing network with preferential attach-
ment. Exploring how learning to resolve conflict may interact with preferential attachment to
influence the structure of human social networks is an exciting prospect for future research.
Data Generation and Analysis
Simulations were written in C++ and run for 106 rounds of play. Data aggregation and network
plots were created using Python and R.
When examining asymmetrical payoffs two approaches were used. First, we consider cases
where xi + yi = 1 but varied the xi/yi ratio between players 1 and 2. Second, we relaxed the
requirement of xi + yi = 1 and considered points varied at regular payoff intervals.
Code Availability
Replication code available on GitHub at
https://github.com/riedlc/ConflictAndConvention.
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